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CHAPTER 5 
INFORMATION THEORY AND 
ENTROPIC APPROACH TO AN ANALYSIS OF FISCAL INEQUALITY 
 
5.1  Introduction 
 
The fiscal decentralisation indices, as developed in Chapters 3 and 4, have two 
potentially significant limitations. First, each subnational government (“SNG”) is 
implicitly treated as fiscally homogenous. In effect, per capita revenue and expenditure in 
each subnational region are implicitly assumed to be equal. However, SNGs typically 
involve large fiscal differences that may have implications for fiscal decentralisation. 
Second, but related to the first point, the structure of fiscal arrangements is ignored. 
SNGs are not differentiated by type – the state government level is not distinguished from 
the local government level. As such, the new indices developed earlier account only for 
the more fundamental influences on the fiscal autonomy and fiscal importance of SNGs 
while ignoring the impact of fiscal differences between them.  
 
To redress these shortcomings, the background for the extension of the fiscal 
decentralisation index in future studies is developed, using information theory developed 
by Theil (1967). The main goals are to account for: (i) the distributions of state and local 
government revenue and expenditure shares between the regions physically defined by 
the border of state jurisdictions, and (ii) the distribution of state and local government 
revenue and expenditure shares within a physical region defined by the state-level 
governments. The concepts of “between-set entropy” and “within-set entropy” appear to 
have the potential to account for heterogeneity in fiscal shares across different levels of 
government.  
 
The main purpose of the analysis of SNGs’ fiscal inequality is to consider the 
impact of the distribution of revenue and expenditure between various levels of 
government on fiscal decentralisation. SNGs consist of two distinct levels: state (or 
province) and local levels. Fiscal inequality is examined in two different contexts: (i)  95
geographic (subnational government units are grouped based on their geography), when 
one set of governments includes the state government and a number of local 
governments; and (ii) hierarchical (subnational government units are grouped based on 
their hierarchy), when one set of governments consists of all state governments and the 
other set includes all local governments. Fiscal inequality is relevant to fiscal 
decentralisation because it captures the influence of the structure of fiscal arrangements 
on decentralisation. When fiscal inequality of subnational governments within a 
geographically defined area is relatively high, the fiscal difference between the different 
tiers of SNGs is also relatively high, and, hence, there is a higher degree of fiscal 
decentralisation relative to the case where fiscal inequality is low. 
 
In this chapter, following this introduction, Section 5.2 discusses information 
theory from Theil (1967), which lays the foundation for the analyses of fiscal inequality 
across subnational regions. Analytical framework for the analysis of fiscal inequality is 
established and discussed in Section 5.3. Section 5.4 discusses the compositions of 
revenue inequality. Concluding remarks are included in Section 5.5. 
 
5.2  Analytical framework: information theory 
 
The future is uncertain since no one knows for sure what will happen. This forms 
the role of expectation for various purposes of life. In every corner of life, with millions 
of events, everything has some possibility of occurring. Some events may simultaneously 
occur at the same time whereas some cannot. In the first case, two or more events are 
happening at the same time because their occurrence is just a happy coincidence. 
However, for the latter case, events are said to be mutually exclusive to each other. The 
possibility of occurrence of two events, sunny hours and dark rainy weather, at the same 
time is impossible. Every event is expected to happen with its own “probability”. This 
section sets out the principles of information theory, drawing on Theil (1967, chapters 2 
and 3).  
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5.2.1  What is information? 
 
I could not find my keys to open the drawers when I got back from lunch, and I 
have no idea where they could be. Some options may be available to answer my query. 
They may be at home. I may have left them in my supervisor’s office when I was there 
before lunch to discuss my paper. They could also be left at University House where I 
went for lunch today. Another possibility is that the keys were left in the photocopying 
room where I went to collect my printing after lunch. Or, I have lost them on the way to 
university this morning. Each of these carries its own “probability” to be correct. It is 
very time-consuming and difficult to answer the question of where my keys are since 
there may be many other options. In this case, to answer my question, some 
“information” is needed. 
 
While I am searching everywhere in my office to see where my keys are and 
thinking of where they could possibly be, my supervisor came in and let me know that: “I 
saw your keys near the printer in the photocopying room downstairs two minutes ago”. 
With this “message”, many “possible” places where my keys could be are excluded. This 
message confirms that my keys are in specific place. This message can be considered the 
definite and reliable message since it confirms accurately where my keys are. As a result, 
a possibility E  will occur with the probability x  with 01 x ≤ ≤  where  0 x =  means 
that this possibility will not be realised and  1 x =  means that this possibility is definitely 
realised.  
 
Now, the ideas of the so-called “information content” of a definite and reliable 
message are discussed. If, before the message is received, I never thought that my keys 
could be in the photocopying room, the information content of the message is very high 
because it is really outside my expectation. However, if the photocopying room is one of 
the places I am thinking of, the information context should be lower than in the first case 
since, at least, it is also listed in the selected places I am searching for my keys. When x  
is close to 0, say,  0.01 x = , the information content of the message is very large.  97
However, when x   is close to one, say,  0.95 x = , the message has provided a little 
information content. To formalise these ideas, let  () hx be the information content of a 
definite and reliable message x. It is obvious that  () hx will be the decreasing function of 
the probabilityx. This is because “the more unlikely the event before the message on its 
realisation, the larger the information content” (Theil, 1967, p.3). Among many different 
decreasing functions, the logarithm of the reciprocal of the probability x is widely used.  
(2.1)      
1
() l o g l o g hx x
x
== −  
The other reason for the logarithmic function to be selected among many 
decreasing functions is the additivity of this function in the case of independent events. 
Suppose that  1 E  with  probability  1 x  and  2 E  with  probability  2 x  are  stochastically 
independent, their product  12 . x x  is the probability that both events occur. In this case, the 
information content of the message which informs us that “both events did occur”, 
12 (, ) hx x , will be as follows: 
(2.2)       12 1 2
12 1 2
11 1
( , ) log log log ( ) ( )
.
hx x hx hx
xx x x
== + = +  
The far right-hand side of the equation (2.2) includes the information content of the 
message telling us that “Event  1 E  occurred”,  1 () hx , and the information content of the 
other message of “Event  2 E  occurred”,  2 () hx . As a consequence, as the equation (2.2) 
shows, the information content of the message which informs us that “both events did 
occur” is the sum of the information content of “Event  1 E  occurred” and the information 
content of “Event  2 E   occurred”. This additivity is a very convenient property of 
definition in equation (2.1). 
 
5.2.2  The entropy as the information content 
 
In light of the previous discussion, it is clear that different values of probabilities 
i x  of the event  i E  will provide different meanings. In short, it means that the lower the 
probability of an event occurring, the larger the “information content” of a message.   98
 
Until the message is released, no one can predict how significant the “information 
content” will be as either  12 ( ), ( ),..., ( ) n hx o r hx o r hx  with  different  probabilities 
12 ... n x xx ≠≠ ≠ can occur. However, the average or expected information content can be 
calculated before the message arrives, since we know the probabilities. In this sense, the 
expected information content of the message is just the expected value of the information 
content, that is, the probability weighted average of  12 ( ), ( ),..., ( ) n hx hx hx : 
(2.3)    
11 1
1
() ( ) l o g l o g
nn n
ii i i i
ii i i
H xx h x x x x
x == =
== = − ∑∑ ∑  
Since  i x  is a probability for a particular event to occur, it follows that 01 i x ≤≤  




= < ∑ . Therefore, the negative of this sum,  () H x , cannot be negative. In other 
words,  () H x cannot be negative since it is the weighted average, with all non-negative 
weights  12 , ,..., i x xx , of the non-negative information values  12 ( ), ( ),..., ( ) n hx hx hx . The 
measure ( ) H x  is the expected information of a distribution, which Theil calls “entropy”. 
In addition, the value of the entropy  () H x has a lower limit of zero and the upper limit of 
logn, where n represents a number of events or possibilities, so that 0 ( ) log H xn ≤≤. 
Appendix A.5.1 at the end of the chapter establishes this range for () H x . 
 
5.2.3  Entropy, uncertainty and dispersion 
 
The measure  () H x , defined in equation (2.3), is known as the expected 
information content or the expectation of information. It is developed from the notion of 
the probability of occurrence of certain events. Based on the limits of this entropy, 
0( ) l o g H xn ≤≤, it is said that, prior to the presence of a message which states that A 
occurred, the more uncertainty there is, the larger the expected information content of the 
message. As a consequence, entropy  () H x  can also be used to measure uncertainty of an 
event or an outcome. When an event is certain to occur, its probability is unity. There is  99
no uncertainty, and  () 0 Hx= , the lower limit, in this case. On the other hand, for a given 
number of events, uncertainty is at its maximum level when all events have the same 
probability, 1 n , of occurrence. This case corresponds with the upper limit of the 
expected information content  () l o g H xn = . Moreover, the level of uncertainty will 
increase with an increase in the number of outcomes n. For example, if there are only 
two possible outcomes, the probability of 12 for each outcome presents less uncertainty 
than in the case with 20 possible outcomes which carries a probability of 12 0 to occur. 
In other words, the more equi-likely events that can occur, the more uncertainty there is.     
 
In addition, the entropy  () H x   can also be used to measure dispersion. The 
variance is the most common approach to measure dispersion of the distribution. The 
variance of a continuous random variable with a probability distribution  () f x  is defined 
as: 
22 () ( ) xf xd x σμ
∞
−∞ =− ∫ , where  () xf xd x μ
∞
−∞ =∫   is the mean. In the discrete case, 
entropy is defined as the negative value of the expected logarithms of event probabilities: 
1 () l o g
n
ii i H xx x
= =−∑ . When x   is continuous, entropy is the negative value of 
expectation of the logarithms of the density:  () () l o g () H x f x f xd x
∞
−∞ =−∫ .  
 
To illustrate, suppose x is normally distributed, with the mean μ  and variance 
2 σ , so that:  
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Thus, the entropy of a normal distribution is the sum of the logarithm of the 
standard deviation σ  and a constant equal to 12 l o g 2 π + . Since  () 12 12l o ge = , the 
relationship between the entropy and the variance 
2 σ  of the normal distribution can also 
be expressed as:  ()( )
2 () 1 2l o g2 Hx e π σ = . This shows that the entropy is an increasing 
function of the variance in the case of the normal distribution. Even though when things 
are not normally distributed, however, the general idea that the entropy measures 
dispersion continues to hold.  
 
In conclusion, the entropy  () H x  can be used to measure the expected information 
content, the uncertainty and the dispersion. The entropy  ( ) H x is developed based on the 
concepts of probability alone, so it can take both numerical values (say, 0.1, 0.5,....) and 
“nominal” values (say, “rich” and “poor”). It sheds light on the view that the entropy 
() H x is in contrast to the variance since the variance can only take the numerical values.  
 
The concept of expected information for a direct and reliable message, known as a 
“direct message”, as discussed in Sections 5.2 above, guarantees that, among many 
possibilities, with the presence of a message, at least one event, or possibility, will occur. 
When a message is released, we know with certainty what happened. Recalling the 
example of my lost keys, the message of “I saw your keys near the printer in the 
photocopying room downstairs two minutes ago” provided the certain conclusion that the 
event did occur: My keys were found. However, this type of direct message may not be 
the case for all situations in life. Further analysis on the example of my lost keys below 
will explore this aspect – an indirect message.  101
  
5.2.4  An indirect message: prior and posterior probabilities 
 
Let the previous example now be revised. Instead of receiving the message from 
my supervisor that “I saw your keys near the printer in the photocopying room downstairs 
two minutes ago”, I receive a different message of “I did remember I saw your keys 
somewhere in our school building one minute ago”. After this message is released, I have 
general information on where my keys could be, but not direct information on the 
specific place where they could be found. This has information content: the chance of 
finding my keys somewhere in the school building becomes more probable while the 
chance of finding them in University House, or anywhere else outside our school building 
becomes less probable upon the message being released. Theil calls this type of 
information an indirect message.  
 
When we take one possibility into consideration, an indirect message does not 
confirm any event but it does provide additional information regarding an event that may 
occur in the future. If so, then the expected information content will change. This is 
because, with the release of the message, some events have a higher chance of occurring 
and others have a lower probability of occurring, no guarantee of an event is provided 
with the release of the message. Similar to previous discussions, it is assumed we have n 
chances as  12 , ,..., n E EE   with the probabilities to occur are  12 , ,..., n x xx , respectively. 
These probabilities are known as prior probabilities since they existed before the message 
comes in. When the message comes in, these probabilities will be changed because with 
the presence of the message, some chances become more probable to occur and others 
become less probable to occur. The probabilities for these events  12 , ,..., n E EE  to occur 
become  12 , ,..., n yy y, respectively. These are called as posterior probabilities (Theil, 
1967). As a result, the sum of these posterior probabilities is unity. That means: 
(2.4)        
1






=≥ ∀ = ∑  
These posterior probabilities are also non-negative. If it turns out that one of these 
probabilities is one, all the others are zero, then the message becomes a direct one since  102
this message guarantees one particular event with probability of unity occurs. Recall from 
equation (2.1) regarding the information content, we will then apply for the event  i E  to 
occur with the probabilities before and after the message is released (i.e. its prior and 
posterior probabilities) are  i x  and i y , respectively.  
 
“Probability ex post” is the probability of the event to occur after the message is 
released. In this case, we will not know what happens for sure with the release of the 
message. And the probability in this case is  1 y . In addition, “probability ex ante” is the 
probability of the event to occur before the message is released, still  i x  in this case. 
Therefore, the information content in the case of an “indirect message” is as follows: 








or in words: 
probability ex post






It is important to note that the message itself does not mention any possibility or event  i E  
in particular. This means that the presence of the message does not guarantee the 
occurrence of any event. Any event has its own posterior probability  i y  to occur. In this 
case, the expected information of the indirect message is as follows: 
(2.6)        
1









The expected information of an indirect message  ( : ) I yx  transforms the prior 
probabilities  12 , ,..., n x xx  into the posterior probabilities  12 , ,..., n yy y . And, ( : ) I yx is non-
negative, which can be shown as follows. It is assumed that  0, 1,2,..., i yi n >=  in the 





= = ∑  In this case, the equation  (1 ) ii i xy ε = +  holds, or equivalently: 
1 ii i xy ε =+ . Equation (2.6) can then be rewritten as follows: 
(2.7)        
1











= = ∑ , equation (2.7) can be rewritten as  [ ] 1 (:) l o g ( 1 )
n
ii i i Iyx yε ε
= =− + ∑ . 
In proving that  (:) Iyx is non-negative, because 0 i y ≥ , it is only necessary to prove that 
()[ ] log(1 ) 0 ii i A εε ε =− + ≥. Taking the first-order derivative of  ( ) i A ε  is: 
()() 11 1 1 ii i i dA dε εε ε =− + = + . This is obvious that this derivative disappears when 
0 i ε = . In addition, the derivative  i dA dε  is  positive  when  0 i ε >   and negative when 
0 i ε < . However, regardless of the value of  i ε , negative or positive, the function  () i A ε  is 
always positive as long as  i ε   is a small number. For example, when  0.3 i ε = , 
() [ ] 0.3 0.3 log(1 0.3) 0.0376 0 A =− + = ≥ . In addition, when  0.3 i ε =− , then 
() [ ] 0.3 0.3 log(1 0.3) 0.0567 0 A −= − − − = ≥ . It is clear that  ( ) 0 i A ε =  when  0 i ε = , and 
()0 i A ε >    when  0 i ε ≠ , and the function looks like below. In short, the function 
()0, i A ε ≥  so that  (:) 0 Iyx≥  and the equality sign holds when and only when each  i ε  
disappears, that is, when  ii x y =  for all i. It means that the expected information of an 









It is important to further note that, as previously discussed, in the case 
where 12 ... 1 n x xx n == == , the entropy is at its maximum value. That is  () l o g H xn = . 
In this case, the expected information content of an indirect message  (:) Iyx is: 
(2.8)      
1
1




ny n H y
y =
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( ) i A ε
0
i ε   104
Equation (2.8) tells us that, in a special case for equal prior probabilities, the 
expected information of an indirect message is the difference between the maximum 
value (logn) of the entropy of the posterior probabilities, and the actual value of the 
entropy H(y). 
 
In addition, the expected information of an indirect message  (:) Iyx  as  in 
equation (2.6) can be named as the information inaccuracy. This is because the message 
transforms the prior probabilities (before a realisation of an event) into posterior 
probabilities (after a realisation of an event). The presence of the posterior probabilities 
reveals how allocation of occurrence among events actually took place. When the 
message has a zero expected information (i.e.  (:) 0 Iyx= ), we have 
, where 1,2,..., . ii x yi n ==  In this case, the forecast is perfect. As a result, the higher the 
expected information of an indirect message is, the more inaccurate the forecast is. 
Further analysis and conclusion can be found in the following numerical examples. 
 
5.2.5  A numerical example 
 
The following example illustrates the expected information content of the indirect 
message. It is assumed that there are two events  1 E  and  2 E  which  occur  with 
probabilities  1 x  and  2 x , respectively. If one of these two events must happen, then 
12 1 xx += . It is also assumed that each of these events has the same chance to occur, so 
that  12 0.5 xx == . Suppose the message S states that event  1 E  occurred, then,  1 1 x =  and 
2 0 x = . The statement S confirming the occurrence of event  1 E   is called the direct 
message.  
 
 It is now assumed that the above statement S does not confirm that  1 E  will occur. 
It only provides some more evidence that  1 E  is more likely to occur. As such, prior 
probabilities  1 x  and  2 x  are transformed into the posterior probabilities  1 y  and  2 y . With 
the release of the message S, no event is confirmed to occur. As a result, it is further  105
assumed that  1 0.7 y = . It means that, with the presence of the statement S, the probability 
for the event  1 E  to occur increases from 0.5 to 0.7. Accordingly, the probability for the 
event  2 E  to occur decreases from 0.5 to 0.3. The statement S is no longer the direct 
message because, with its presence, no event is guaranteed to occur. The only effect of 
the message S is to change the probabilities of related events. The expected information 














Table 5.1 explores the changes of the expected information of an indirect message 
at various levels of both prior and posterior probabilities for both events  1 E  and  2 E . The 
difference between prior probabilities  12 , x x  and posterior probabilities  12 , yy  reveals the 
inaccuracy of the indirect message: the higher the difference, the more inaccurate the 
message is.  
TABLE 5.1 
THE EXPECTED INFORMATION CONTENT OF AN INDIRECT MESSAGE 
   Probability( ) 100 ×        Difference  
 Prior      Posterior    (y1 - x1)  Case 
 x 1 x 2  y 1 y 2 
I (y:x) 
 ( ) 100 ×  
  () 100 ×   
1   50  50  50  50  0.00   0 
2   50  50  80  20  8.37   30 
3   50  50  75  25  5.68   25 
4   50  50  70  30  3.57   20 
5   50  50  65  35  1.98   15 
6   50  50  60  40  0.87   10 
 
For example, as in the first case, given in case 1, the indirect message plays no 
role because both prior and posterior probabilities for events  1 E  and  2 E  are unchanged. 
In addition, as illustrated by cases 2 and 3, when the probability of occurrence for Event 
1 E  increases from 0.50 to 0.80 (or 0.75), probability of occurrence of event  2 E  decreases 
from 0.5 to 0.2 (or 0.25), the expected information of the indirect message falls from 8.37  106
per cent (case 2) to 5.68 per cent (case 3). As a consequence, as presented by the last two 
columns, the expected information content of an indirect message  (:) Iyx  decreases as 
the difference between the posterior and prior probabilities, ( ) ii yx − , decreases.  
 
5.2.6  The expected information content 
 
The following section explores the link between the expected information content 
of an indirect message with both prior and posterior probabilities, being weighted by 
respective posterior probabilities. Because the sums of prior or posterior probabilities are 
both unity, the expected information content of an indirect message could be expressed as 
the weighted sum of these two probabilities. From equation (2.6), the expected 
information content of an indirect message is the sum of n terms involving  i x  and  i y . 




== == ∑∑ . Suppose that  ii yx >  for each i, so that  0 ii yx − >  for each i. This 
is contrary to the fact that the sum of both sets of probabilities is unity. As a result, n 
terms in equation (2.6) must consist of some negative terms and some positive terms so 
that  ii yx >  for some i and  j j y x <  for some  j  where i j ≠ . We start with the function in 
logarithms  () log ii yx which we express as: 






=− + ⎢ ⎥
⎣ ⎦
  
For convenience, let  () ii i axy y =− , so that we can write equation (2.9) as 
() () log log 1 . ii yx a =− +  Function  ( ) f a  can be expanded as Maclaurin series:  
(2.10)    
'' ' ' ' ' 4
234 (0) (0) (0) (0)
( ) (0) ...
1! 2! 3! 4!
ff f f
fa f a a a a =+ + + + +  
With  () ( ) log 1 f aa =− + , and  ( ) , iii axy y =−  we  have  ( ) 00 f = ,  ()
' 01 f =− , 
()
'' 01 f = ,  ()
''' 02 f =− and  ()
4 06 . f =  Using these values in equation (2.10), we then 
obtain:  107
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The above expansion converges if ( ) 1, iii xyy − <  or  2 ii x y < . The first term of 
the right-hand side of equation (2.11) is worth considering. If we multiply it by  i y  and 
take the sum, we have:  ( ) ( ) 11 0.
nn
ii ii i i ii yxyy xy
== ⎡⎤ −− = − − = ⎣⎦ ∑∑  The  expected 
information content now becomes: 





( : ) log ...
234
nn n n
ii ii ii i
i
ii i i ii i i
xy xy xy y
Iyx y
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== − + − ∑∑ ∑ ∑  
From these results, the expected information content of an indirect message can also be 
used to represent information inaccuracy because it translates the prior probability into 
posterior probability: the higher the differences between these two probabilities  ii x y −  
are, the more inaccurate the information is.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, many previous attempts to measure the degree of fiscal 
decentralisation involve the use of some form of share of revenue/expenditure at lower-
level jurisdictions in the national total. It is the claim of this chapter that such an 
approach completely ignores important distributional aspects of fiscal arrangements. 
Consider two hypothetical economies, A and B. In both economies, government spending 
and revenue at the national level accounts for 50 per cent of the total, so that the 
remaining 50 per cent is the responsibility of SNGs. In country A, there are only two 
large subnational governments, each with an equal share of total subnational fiscal 
activity (i.e. 50 per cent each); while in country B there are 100 subnational units, each 
accounting for 1 per cent of the 50 per cent total. It is clear that there is substantially 
more fiscal decentralisation in B as compared to A. However, an exclusive focus of the 
split of the total between the national and subnational levels would lead one to 
erroneously conclude that both economies exhibit the same degree of fiscal 
decentralisation. In other words, both the first and second moments of the distribution of 
revenue/expenditure are important for understanding the workings of fiscal arrangements.   108
 
The ideas of expected information of a direct message and an indirect message 
were originally developed by Theil in his influential book Economics and Information 
Theory in 1967. These ideas were further developed to measure the income inequality by 
comparing the income share with the population share of the states. These works lay a 
strong foundation for the development of an analytical framework of fiscal inequality 
which takes into account the dispersions of the revenue and expenditure of various levels 
of SNGs. The following section is devoted to this development. 
 
5.3  Analytical framework for the analysis of subnational fiscal inequality 
 
In his influential study, Theil (1967) advocated the use of entropy-based 
measurement for the analysis of income inequality. In this section, we apply Theil’s 
notion of entropy, as outlined in Section 5.2, to public finances in multi-tiered 
governments. The analysis that follows is devoted to the development of an analytical 
framework which reveals SNGs’ fiscal inequality in terms of revenue shares among 
SNGs. The same framework can be directly applied to the expenditure shares among 
SNGs. The notion of fiscal inequality (or fiscal dispersion) is important for fiscal theory 
on decentralisation because it accounts for the heterogeneity of various subnational units 
in terms of revenue and expenditure shares. However, it should be emphasised that fiscal 
inequality and fiscal equalisation are two distinct concepts, in that fiscal equalisation is 
not designed to redress the notion of fiscal inequality in this chapter. Specifically, the 
concept of fiscal inequality in this chapter relies on “money” (such as revenue and 
expenditure of subnational governments) as the unit of comparison, whereas the fiscal 
equalisation process (such as that adopted in Australia) is concerned with equalising the 
capacity of SNGs to provide the same “real” level of service. 
 
It is assumed that a country has P states (the second level of government) and Q 
local councils (the third level of government) and each local council belongs to one state. 
Let  NPQ =+   be a total number of local and state governments, the number of 
subnational governments (SNGs). It is further assumed that each subnational government  109
accounts for a non-negative fraction of total subnational revenue, to be denoted by  i r  
which, for short, we shall refer to as the “regional revenue share”. The sum of all these 
revenue shares is equal to unity: 
1 1, 0 1,..., .
N
ii i rri N
= =≥ ∀ = ∑  Let  r  denote  the 
vector of revenue shares  1,.., N rr . The entropy of revenue shares is defined as:  
  (3.1)      
1
1






=∑ r  
Entropy  () H r can be regarded as the measure of the  equality with which revenue is 
distributed among the SNGs. When the revenue distribution is extremely equal in that 
each SNG has the same revenue share (i.e.,  1 i rN = ) and revenue entropy is at its 
maximum:  () log . H N = r  At the other extreme, when only one SNG collects all SNGs’ 
revenue so that others have no revenue at all (i.e.,  1 i r =  and  0 j r =  for  ij ≠ ), the 
minimum value of the entropy is achieved:  ( ) 0. H = r   As a result, the range of the 
entropy is  () 0l o g . H N ≤≤ r  
 
 In the context of considering the relevance of the distribution of revenue among 
SNGs for its impact on fiscal decentralisation, it is appropriate to focus on revenue 
inequality between SNGs, rather than revenue equality. Revenue inequality is measured 
by deducting the revenue entropy,  ( ), H r  from its maximum value, log : N  
(3.2)              
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Due to the constraints on the range of the entropy  ( ), H r  it is clear that the range of this 
measurement of revenue inequality is 0 - perfect equality (when  ( ) log H N = r ) - and 
log N  - maximum inequality (when  ( ) 0 H = r ).  The entropy  ( ) H r  is an attractive way 





5.3.1  Axiom 1: The proportionality test 
 
The entropy (3.1) is expressed in terms of the revenue shares of SNGs. Thus, if all 
revenues change proportionally, the shares do not change, and measure (3.2) remains 
unchanged. This invariance of revenue inequality to a proportional change is the 
proportionality test.  
 
5.3.2  Axiom 2: The “Haves and Have Nots” test 
 
The upper limit of  () H r  increases  with  , N   so the maximum value of the 
inequality measure (3.2) rises with  . N  Consider two hypothetical countries. First, in a 
two-subnational-region country, there is perfect inequality when one SNG accounts for 
all revenue, and the other has no revenue. The entropy of the revenue shares is zero, and 
the value of (3.2) is log2. Second, in a society consisting of 10,000 SNGs, revenue 
inequality is at maximum when 9,999 SNGs have no revenue. The value of revenue 
inequality is now log10,000. It is obvious that revenue distribution in the latter is much 
more unequal than the first country. In the first country, one-half of the SNGs (one SNG) 
accounts for all subnational revenue and the other half has no revenue. As a result, 
revenue inequality of the second country is as unequal as for the first country when one-
half of the SNGs account for all subnational revenue and when each of these has the same 
revenue. The concern is that whether revenue inequality, as expressed in equation (3.2), 
satisfies this condition. The following material reveals that this is true by showing that as 
a larger fraction of SNGs join the “revenue” group, revenue inequality falls. This 
establishes that revenue inequality will be uniquely determined by the size of the revenue 
group (which we call “the haves”) relative to the “no-revenue” group (“the have nots”). 
 
Assume there is a set S which consists of M  subnational governments where 
0. M N <≤ It is further assumed that SNGs in set S  account for all subnational revenue, 
so that SNGs outside set S have no revenue. Also, within set S , each SNG accounts for  111















(3.3)      
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where  M N θ =   is the fraction of SNGs in the country who jointly account for all 
subnational revenue. The application of the last member of equation (3.3) to the second 
example above with  10,000 = N  and  5,000 10,000 1 2, θ = =   reveals that revenue 
inequality is also log2.  
 
From these two examples, we can conclude that when revenue is equally 
distributed among some groups of SNGs in the society, and the remaining SNGs outside 
these groups have no revenue, revenue inequality of the country is determined solely by 
the fraction θ  - the ratio of the number of SNGs in the group to the total number of 
SNGs. In both examples above, this ratio is 1 2, and the revenue inequality is log2. This 
result is consistent with intuition: when the number of SNGs receiving revenue,  , M  
increases, revenue distribution becomes more equal. The above discussion shows that as 
the inequality (3.3) decreases as the share of a number of SNGs which receive revenue 
rises, this measure satisfies the “Haves and Have Nots” axiom. 
 
5.3.3  Axiom 3: The revenue transfer test 
 
Consider an economy consisting of two SNGs only A (rich) and B  (poor) with 
the revenue shares  A r  and  B r , where  . A B rr >  Suppose that some revenue is transferred 
from  A  to  , B  such  that  0. AB dr dr +=   A reasonable measure of revenue inequality 
should indicate that such a transfer from the rich SNG to the poor SNG has the effect of 
decreasing inequality. Does equation (3.2) satisfy this property? The following material 
shows that it does have this property.  112
 
It is assumed that there are G  sets of SNGs, to be denoted by  1,.., , G S S  and each 




= = ∑  To give some practical significance to the symbols, consider a three-tiered 
government: tier 1 - national government; tier 2 - state government; and tier 3 – local 
government.  g S  represents the set of state and local governments in the geographical 
region defined by the jurisdiction of State . g   g N  is the total number of state and local 
governments within the jurisdiction defined by State . g  In view of this, the entropy of 
revenue shares, equation (3.1), can now be expressed as: 
(3.4)      
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where the component inside the square brackets is the entropy of revenue shares within 
set  . g S  Let  g R  be the sum of revenue shares of all SNGs in set  , g S  ; g i g i R r ∈ =∑ S  this 




= = ∑  The entropy of revenue shares 
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r  where  g r  is the vector of  i r  that fall under 
, g S as the within-set entropy, we have: 











Combining equations (3.4) and (3.5), the total entropy becomes: 
 (3.6)         ()
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=+ ∑∑ rr   113
On the right-hand side of this equation, the first component is a weighted average of the 
within-set entropies  () ( ) 11 ,..., , GG HH rr  with the group revenue shares  1,..., G RR  as the 
weights. The second term on the right of equation (3.6) is the between-set entropy, 
() 1 log 1 .
G
gg g R R
= ∑  
  
We consider equation (3.6) in the context of SNGs A (rich) and B  (poor) in two 
situations: (i) when they are the only SNGs of the country, so that  2; N =  and (ii) when 
the nation is made up of  , A B   plus all other SNGs, so that  2. N >  When  2, N =  the 
country comprises two groups,  1 , SA =  and  2 , SB =  which we shall denote by  A S  and 
. B S  Similarly, the revenue shares are  1 A Rr =  and  2 , B Rr =  with  1. AB rr + =  As there is 
only one SNG in each group, the within-group entropies are zero,  ( )( ) 0, AA BB Hr Hr ==  
as is their weighted average. Accordingly, in this case, equation (3.6) simplifies to: 
()
11















This entropy is at its maximum when  12 . AB rr = =  In that case, the entropy is 
() 1 2log2 1 2log2 log2, H =+= r  as is illustrated below. From the graph, it is clear that 
any deviations from the equal shares of  12 AB rr = =  will result in a lower value of the 
entropy, that is, higher revenue inequality. As A is richer than  , B  the initial revenue 
1 - x 
0 
() H r  
0.5  1 





distribution is represented in the graph by the shares  12 x >  and ( ) 11 2 . x −<  When 
revenue is transferred from A  to  , B   both revenue shares move towards 12 , the 
distribution becomes more equal and the entropy increases. 
 
Next, consider the  2 N >  case where there are three groups of SNGs: (i) Group A 
with only one SNG  ; A  group  B  with SNG  ; B  and (iii) group C  with () 2 N −  SNGs 
comprising every SNG in the economy except A and  . B  These three groups are denoted 
by  ,, a n d. A BC S SS  We assume that the joint revenue share of  A and B is a constant, i.e. 
constant. AB A B rrR + += =  This implies that the revenue share of group  , C   , C R  is also 
constant at  AB 1R . + −  It is further assumed that there are no revenue transfers to or from 
the other SNGs of the society in  . C S  We now apply decomposition (3.6) to this economy. 
The weighted average of the within-group entropies, the first term on the right-hand side 
of equation (3.6), is: 
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r  with  C r  is the vector of  i r  that fall under group  , C S  is 
the within-group entropy of group  . C  The first and second components in the second step 
of equation (3.7), the within-group entropies for groups A  and  , B  disappear  because 
there is only one SNG in each group. In addition, the between-group entropy, the second 
term on the right-hand side of equation (3.6), now becomes: 
(3.8)    
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Substituting equations (3.7) and (3.8) into equation (3.6), the total entropy for this three-
group country becomes: 
(3.9)     () ()
111




=+++ rr  
When we transfer revenue from A  to  , B   with the distribution within  C S  remaining 
unchanged, equation (3.9) can be expressed as:  115
(3.10)       ()
11




=++ r  
The constant in (3.10) includes  ( ) log 1 CC RR  and  ( ). CCC RH r  In words, the total entropy 
of the three-group country is equal to the total entropy of the two-group country plus a 
constant. Accordingly, the impact on inequality of a transfer from A to B  is the same in 
the  2 N >  case as it is in the  2 N =  case.  
 
To summarise this discussion, revenue inequality decreases if there is a transfer of 
revenue from the rich SNG to the poor SNG. This conclusion holds for a society with 
two-subnational regions () 2, N =  as well as in the higher-dimensional case () 2. N >  In 
short, it is clear that the measure of revenue inequality satisfies the revenue transfer test. 
 
5.4  Decomposing revenue inequality 
 
In the above, we decomposed revenue equality into within-set and between-set 
terms. We now show that revenue inequality can be similarly decomposed.  
  
Recall from equation (3.6) that the entropy is decomposed into two distinct 
components: a weighted average of the within-set entropy and the between-set entropy. 
Furthermore, as in (3.2), inequality is measured by the difference between the maximum 
value of the entropy, log N  and the entropy  () . H r  Thus, by combining equations (3.2) 
and (3.6), revenue inequality can be expressed as: 
(4.1)    
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The right-hand side of equation (4.1) remains unchanged if we subtract and add 
1 log ,
G
g g g R N
= ∑  where  g R  and  g N  are the revenue share of and a number of SNGs in set 
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As the result, revenue inequality can be expressed as follows: 
(4.2)    
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Result (4.2) reveals that revenue inequality consists of two distinct components: (i) a 
weighted average of within-set inequalities and (ii) a between-set inequality. The right-
hand side of equation (4.2) parallels the decompositions given by equation (3.6). The 
meaning of the two components of equation (4.2) is discussed further in what follows. 
 
5.4.1  The within-set inequalities 
 
The first component of (4.2) is a weighted average of the within-set inequalities: 


















The term  ig rR is the conditional revenue share of SNG i within group  , g S  that is, SNG 
i’s revenue share within the group. Also,  g N  represents a number of SNGs in group  . g S  








∈ =∑ S  the 
within-set revenue inequality for group  , g S  and (b) 
1 ,
G
g g g R Z
= ∑  the weighted average of 
the within-set revenue inequalities. We discuss each in turn. 
  
If each SNG in set  g S   receives an equal revenue share, then  ig rR k =  (say). 
However, as  ( ) 1,
g ig i rR
∈ = ∑ S  it follows that  1. g kN =  When each SNG has an equal 
share of the group’s revenue, i.e.,  1, , ig g g rR N i = ∈S  then there is no dispersion of the  117
revenue distribution within the group, the perfect equality. Accordingly, the extent to 
which the  g N  ratios 









deviate from unity is a measure of revenue inequality within set  . g S  The  within-set 
measure of revenue inequality, the term in square brackets of equation (4.3), is a 
weighted average of the logarithms of the ratios in equation (4.4), the weights being the 
conditional revenue shares.  
 
5.4.2  The between-set inequality 
 
The second term on the right-hand side of (4.2) is the between-set inequality: 









NN = ∑   
The basic ingredient of inequality (4.5) is the contrast between two sets of shares, the 
revenue shares of the G  groups,  1,..., G R R   and the corresponding population shares, 
1 ,..., . G NN N N  If all groups receive their pro-rata shares of revenue based on 
population, i.e.  , 1,..., , gg R NN g G ==   then there is no dispersion of revenue 
distribution and we have perfect between-set revenue equality.  
  
In summary, total inequality consists of two components: the weighted average of 
the within-set inequality and the between-set inequality. Interestingly, it is clear that both 
components are of the form of the expected information content of an indirect message 
which was previously discussed in Section 5.2.4. For the within-set inequality, the prior 
and posterior probabilities are 1 g N  and  ig rR, respectively. Similarly, for a between-set 
inequality,  g NN  and  g R   are prior and posterior probabilities. Furthermore, from 
equation (4.2), the revenue inequality, can be written as: 
(4.6)      
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The far right-hand side of equation (4.6) reveals that total revenue inequality can also be 
expressed in the form of the expected information content of an indirect message. In this 
case, the prior and posterior probabilities are 1 N  and  , i r   respectively. With this 
perspective, it is clear that the message that transforms the vector [] 1 ,...,1 NN ′ into 
[] 1,..., N rr ′   is equivalent to two sub-messages. The first message transforms   
1 ,...,1 gg NN ′ ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦  into  1 ,..., , gg g rR rR′ ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦   1,..., , g G =  which could be called “the within-
set message”, and the second message transforms [] 1 ,..., G NN N N ′ into [] 1,..., , G RR ′  
which is “the between-set message”. 
 
The entropic analysis of fiscal arrangements can, of course, be extended to the 




5.4.3  Why not per capita fiscal data? 
 
The above fiscal inequalities are expressed in terms of the number of SNGs, 
rather than a number of individuals. That is to say, according to our approach, per capita 
fiscal data are not incorporated in the measurement of fiscal decentralisation. Why?  
 
Consider the two hypothetical countries A and B. Country A has two local 
councils, each of the same size, whereas country B consists of 100 local councils (again, 
all of the same size). Government revenue generated by country A is equal to the sum of 
revenue of the 100 councils in country B. As it has many more local councils, country B 
is more fiscally decentralised as compared to country A. This conclusion is reasonable 
and stands independently of the size of the population in the two countries, and how the 
population is distributed across the 100 local governments in country B. 
 
                                                 
2 Fiscal inequality based on SNGs’ expenditure shares are presented in Chapter 6.   119
Next, consider a real-world example from the fastest-growing state in Australia, 
Western Australia (“WA”). In terms of total expenditure, the largest local government in 
WA is the City of Stirling, while the smallest is the Shire of Three Springs. Columns 2 
and 3 of Table 5.2 show that expenditure in Stirling is almost 100 times greater than that 
in Three Springs. However, the population in Stirling is almost 250 times larger than that 
of Three Springs (columns 4 and 5). Spending per capita is therefore significantly higher 
in Three Springs than in Stirling, as presented in column 6. 
TABLE 5.2 
EXPENDITURE AND POPULATION IN TWO LOCAL COUNCILS 
IN WESTERN AUSTRALIA, 2004 
Expenditure Population Per capita 
expenditure  Fiscal weight 
 
Local council 
$' '000  Per cent of 
WA total  Persons  Per cent of 
WA total  $ Deflated 
 
(1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
City of Stirling  100,405  5.97  182,047  9.06  552  0.66  3.94 
Shire of Three Springs  1,338  0.08  722  0.04  1,853  2  0.16 
Source: Unpublished ABS data. 
 
Let  i s  be the expenditure share of local council  ( ) 1,...,143 , ii =  and 
143
1 i i SS
= =∑  
be total expenditure,  ii s SS =  be the share,  i P  be the population of i and  
143
1 i i PP
= =∑  
be total population, and  ii p PP =   be the corresponding share. Then the ratio of the 





==  is “deflated” per capita 
expenditure of the 
th i  council. If all local councils receive their pro rata expenditure share 
based on population, then   1 ii sp =  for each  . i  Column 7 shows that deflated per capita 
expenditure of Stirling and Three Springs is 0.66 and 2, respectively, so that Stirling’s 
weighting for fiscal calculations is 3.94 as shown in column 8 (i.e. Stirling’s per cent of 
WA population multiplied by 0.66) and Three Springs’ fiscal weighting would be 0.16 
(i.e. Three Springs’ per cent of WA population multiplied by 2.00). Accordingly, if per 
capita expenditure is considered, the smallest local government area, Three Springs, 
would, in effect, play a “relatively” more important role in measuring the degree of fiscal 
decentralisation in WA. Such an approach, while relevant to many issues in fiscal  120
federalism (e.g. fiscal equalisation), may provide a misleading picture of the degree of 
fiscal decentralisation. In the context of measuring pure dispersion of revenue and 
expenditure among SNGs in monetary terms, the number of governments within a given 
tier appears to be a relevant indicator of decentralisation
3. 
 
5.4.4  A note on notation 
 
In the above discussion, the results are formulated in logarithmic terms. For future 
reference, it is convenient to take the antilogarithm of the inequality measure.  
 
We start by expressing revenue inequality in terms of information theory as 
discussed in Section 5.2. Recall the second component on the right-hand side of equation 
(4.2), the between-set inequality, which is a weighted average of the logarithms of the 









NN = ∑  Let  i m  and  i q  be the revenue share and institutional share of the 
th i  
region, that is,  , ii mM M =  where  , i M M  are the revenue of the 
th i  region and the total 
economy, and  , ii qQ Q =  where  , i QQ  are the number of SNGs in the 
th i  region and the 





== The numerator 
of this ratio is revenue per SNG of the 
th i  region, while the denominator is revenue per 
SNG. If  [] 1,..., N mm ′ = m  and  [] 1,..., , N qq ′ = q   the between-region inequality can be 
expressed in terms of information theory as: 
()
1








=∑ mq   
The ratio  ii mq  is “deflated” per SNG revenue of the 
th i  set. The term “deflated” here 
means that revenue is expressed as relative to national revenue for SNG. The above 
                                                 
3 When two tiers of SNGs are considered, the number of governments is still relevant because each set of 
governments (for between-set analysis) can be specified by hierarchical level (e.g. the “local” level and 
the “state” level).  121
() : I mq is the logarithm of a weighted average of deflated revenue per SNG, so that the 
corresponding geometric mean is: 















If all SNGs receive their pro rata share based on a number of SNGs, then   1 ii mq =  for 
each i,  () 1 1
i m N
ii i mq = ∏ =  and there is no revenue dispersion. Accordingly, the further the 
mean (4.7) is away from unity, the greater is revenue inequality across sets. Similarly, on 
the expenditure side, the geometric mean is: 















where  [] 1,..., N s s ′ = s  and  [] 1,..., N qq ′ = q  with  i s  and  i q   is the expenditure share and 
institutional share of the 
th i  region. 
 
5.5  Concluding remarks 
 
The fundamental index of fiscal decentralisation (FDI) and the enhanced index 
(eFDI) developed in Chapters 3 and 4 take into account the fundamental issues of fiscal 
decentralisation – fiscal autonomy and fiscal importance of SNGs together with the 
positive effect of intergovernmental fiscal transfers from the national government, 
however, those indices are insensitive with the different distributions of revenue and 
expenditure among SNGs and a number of SNGs. In response to these potential 
limitations, an entropic approach to the analysis of subnational fiscal inequality has been 
developed in this chapter. 
 
One of the contributions of this chapter is illustrated with a simple example. 
Consider two hypothetical nations V and L which exhibit the same degree of fiscal 
decentralisation, using either the fundamental index (FDI) or the enhanced index (eFDI), 
(i.e. the structure of revenue, expenditure, total fiscal transfer, total unconditional transfer 
is the same in two countries). It is now further assumed that these two countries consist of  122
four subnational regions: A, B, C and D, each with different levels of revenue (and 
expenditure). Table 5.3 provides data for this example.  
   TABLE 5.3 
   ILLUSTRATING FISCAL INEQUALITY  
      Country V    Country L 
  Own-sourced  
revenue 
Share in total  Own-sourced 
revenue 
Share in total  
 
Region/  
Measures   
($ millions)  Actual Average Difference  ($ millions)  Actual  Average  Difference 
  (1)    (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) = (4) – (3) (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) = (8) – (7)
1.  A    3,000 0.010 0.250  0.240  3,300 0.011  0.250  0.239 
2. B    125,000  0.427 0.250  -0.177 271,390  0.926  0.250  -0.676 
3. C    97,000  0.331 0.250  -0.081 10,810  0.037  0.250  0.213 
4. D    68,000  0.232 0.250  0.018 7,500  0.026  0.250  0.224 
5. Total    293,000  1.000 1.000 0.000  293,000  1.000  1.000 0.000 
6.  Standard  deviation     0.178 0.000     0.451  0.000   
7.  Entropy     0.484 0.602     0.146  0.602   
8. Fiscal  inequality     0.118 0.000     0.456  0.000   
 
Column 2 shows that there is one small region in country V, region A. Revenue 
from region B is almost double that of D and forty times higher than that of region A. 
Columns 3 and 4 present the actual and average revenue shares for 4 regions in country 
V. By contrast, in country L, there is one large and three small regions. Region B 
accounts for more than 92 per cent of the total revenue of all regions, and the remaining 8 
per cent is spread across the three small regions A, C, and D.  
 
  Row 6 presents the standard deviations of the revenue shares of the two, 0.178 
and 0.451. This clearly reveals that the distribution of revenue of country L is 
more dispersed than in V. 
  Row 7 gives the values of the fiscal entropy, defined as  log , ii rr −∑  where  i r  is 
the revenue share of SNG  . i  The entropy value in country V is 0.484 and 0.146 
in country L, as shown in columns 3 and 7 of row 7, respectively. If we were to 
assume alternatively that each region accounts for the same share of 25 per cent,  123
as shown by columns 4 and 8, there is no inequality, so that fiscal entropy for 
both countries is log4 0.602, =  as in row 8, columns 4 and 8. 
  Row 8 presents the fiscal inequality, the difference between the maximum level 
of the entropy, log4, or 0.602, and the actual level. Fiscal inequality is 0.118 
and 0.456 for countries V and L, respectively. Higher fiscal inequality in L 
means a greater degree of revenue dispersion among SNGs and, as a result, 
suggests a lower degree of fiscal decentralisation because revenue is allocated 
more disproportionately across regions
4. 
 
To summarise this example, countries V and L may exhibit the same degree of 
fiscal decentralisation as previously discussed in Chapter 1
5. But as there is much more 
fiscal inequality in country L, it can be reasonably concluded that the true situation may 
be different: there is less fiscally decentralised in country L. As such, the fundamental 
index and the enhanced index may be partial measures of fiscal decentralisation because 
they ignore the dispersion of revenue (and expenditure) across regions. The issue of 
subnational fiscal inequality and its relationship to the degree of fiscal decentralisation 
are investigated further in the context of Australia and Denmark in Chapter 6, by 










                                                 
4   To better appreciate the relationship between fiscal inequality and fiscal decentralisation, it is necessary 
to consider the distinction between “within-set” inequality and “between-set” inequality for geographic 
regions and political hierarchy, as discussed in the next chapter. 
5   To minimise repetition, this example is not reproduced here. For further details, refer to Table 1.1 of 
Chapter 1.  124
Appendix A5.1 
THE RANGE OF THE ENTROPY 
 
The Appendix shows that the entropy  () H x  falls in the range with a lower limit 
zero and the upper limit logn, where n represents a number of events or possibilities.  
 
For the lower limit, it is clear that when the event  i E  occurs with certainty,  1 i x = , 
and  0f o ra l l j x i j =≠ . Thus the probability vector ( ) 12 , ,..., ,..., (0, 0,...,1,..., 0) in xx x x = . 




= − = ∑ . This establishes that the lower 
bound of  () H x  is zero if and only if  1 i x =  for some i. 
 
Regarding the upper limit, the task now is to maximise the 
1 log
n
ii i x x
= ∑ , subject 
to 
1 1w h e r e 0 1
n
ii i xx
= =≤ ≤ ∑ . To do this, we formulate the Lagrangian function: 
 
    () 1
11




Lx x x x x λλ
==
⎛⎞
= −− − ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ∑∑ , 
 
where  λ   is the Lagrangian multiplier. The first-order condition is 
log 1 0 ii Lx x λ ∂∂= − −−=. This is equivalent to  ( ) log 1 i x λ = −+ . This equation shows 
that  i x  is independent of i . This happens when and only when  12 ... 1 i x xx n = === .  
When  1 i x n = ,  () H x  takes its upper value of logn.   125
CHAPTER 6 
FISCAL INEQUALITY: AN APPLICATION FOR  
AUSTRALIA AND DENMARK 
 
6.1  Introduction 
  
The goal of this chapter is to utilise the notion of fiscal inequality, to identify 
factors that will need to be considered when the fundamental index (FDI) and the 
enhanced index (eFDI), as developed in Chapters 3 and 4, are extended in future 
research. This is done by analysing subnational fiscal inequality for Australia and 
Denmark. Besides Australia, a federal nation, Denmark is selected as this is the only 
other country whose fiscal data of revenue and expenditure on three levels of government 
are publicly available. In addition, Denmark is a unitary country which may reveal 
different implications for SNGs’ fiscal inequality when compared to Australia. The 
entropic factors considered in this chapter account for fiscal dispersions between and 
within sets, where sets are defined first on a “geographic” basis (i.e. a defined area of 
land) and then, on a “governmental” basis (i.e. for two hierarchical tiers of subnational 
governments). The results of fiscal inequality in Australia and Denmark can be used to 
draw attention to fiscal inequality which may exist in other countries, and, as such, these 
factors should be reflected in measuring fiscal decentralisation.  
 
Following the introduction, Section 6.2 discusses fiscal federalism in Australia 
with the emphasis on its revenue and expenditure patterns which lead to an analysis of 
geographic (regional) and governmental (hierarchical) fiscal inequality. Australia’s data 
are used to illustrate these important notions. In addition, Section 6.3 analyses a similar 
analytical case study for Denmark which is, in principle, in contrast with Australia in 
terms of fiscal arrangements and roles of SNGs. Some interesting conclusions drawn 
from case studies for Australia and Denmark are discussed on Section 6.4, followed by 
concluding remarks in Section 6.5.   
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6.2  Australian fiscal federalism 
 
This section applies fiscal inequality measures to Australia represented by 
equations (4.3), (4.5) and (4.6) from Chapter 5. These inequalities are particularly 
relevant to Australia because there are great regional fiscal disparities. We start with a 
brief description of fiscal arrangements in Australia.  
 
The Commonwealth of Australia was established in 1901 as a Federation in which 
six self-governing British colonies became the six states of Australia. The main purpose 
of this unification was to form a strong and open country by eliminating tariffs on 
interstate trade. More than one century after its formation, modern Australia is still seen 
as a “young” country in comparison with many nations from the “old” world. Australia 
now consists of six states and two territories (hereafter referred to in aggregate as the 
“states”) with a total number of local councils of 700. The eight “states” of Australia are 
New South Wales (NSW), Victoria (Vic.), Queensland (QLD), South Australia (SA), 
Western Australia (WA), Tasmania (Tas.) and two territories, Northern Territory (NT) 
and Australian Capital Territory (ACT). The first tier of government is occupied by the 
Commonwealth Government. The second tier is represented by state governments. The 
third and lowest tier of government is represented by local councils.  
 
In geographic terms, the three levels of government are not mutually exclusive. 
The geographic region associated with each state includes a state and many local 
governments. The geographic area associated with the Commonwealth government also 
includes state and local governments. The fiscal authority of different levels overlaps – 
residents in each local government are influenced by fiscal activities of local, state, and 
federal governments. However, ACT has no local governments because of its special 
nature of administration. The ACT government performs two roles: one as the “state” 
government and another role as the “local” government. On this basis, 700 local 
governments in Australia are allocated to seven “states”, namely NSW (192)
6, Vic. (79), 
QLD (125), SA (68), WA (143), Tas. (29), and NT (64). 
                                                 
6 Due to the NSW amalgamation exercise in 2004, local government numbers post-2004 have declined.  127
6.2.1  Revenue and expenditure patterns 
 
Table 6.1 reveals that the allocation of revenue and expenditure across local 
councils in Australia is significantly dispersed.  
TABLE 6.1 
REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE SHARES, 
LOCAL COUNCILS, AUSTRALIA, AVERAGE: 2000-2004  
(1,000*Per cent of total) 




councils  Mean Median Standard
deviation Min Max   Mean Median Standard 
deviation  Min Max 
1. NSW  192  1.744 0.847  2.082  0.013 12.487   1.704  0.913  1.848  0.015  8.386 
2. Vic.  79  2.559  1.758 2.410  0.237 16.629   2.784  1.946  2.172 0.273  13.578
3. QLD  125 2.191  0.603  7.495  0.098 77.079   2.039  0.609  6.666  0.144  69.045
4. SA  68 0.865  0.459 1.155  0.056 7.069    0.899  0.539  1.034 0.079  5.400 
5. WA  143 0.617  0.189 1.016  0.041 6.308    0.637  0.257  0.872 0.069  5.387 
6. Tas.  29  1.004  0.569 1.156  0.163 4.592    1.006  0.602  1.082 0.210  4.587 
7. NT  64 0.203  0.096 0.357  0.003 2.651    0.259  0.139  0.364 0.019  2.665 
Source: Unpublished data from ABS. Data are averages over the period 2000–2004. 
 
Brisbane City Council in Queensland is the largest local council in Australia with 
revenue and expenditure shares of 7.7 per cent and 6.9 per cent of all local councils. The 
second and third biggest councils are the Gold Coast Council (QLD) and Melbourne City 
(Vic.). On the other hand, Timber Creek (NT) is the smallest council with revenue and 
expenditure shares of around 0.0003 per cent and 0.0019 per cent, respectively. As in 
Figures 6.2-6.3, there is considerable dispersion of revenue and expenditure between and 
within states.  
FIGURE 6.1 
DISTRIBUTION OF LOCAL COUNCIL SHARES  



























































































































































   SD = 3.2 
      n = 700 
Expenditure 
Mean = 1.4 
   SD = 3.6 




DISTRIBUTION OF REVENUE ACROSS LOCAL COUNCILS 
AUSTRALIAN STATES, AVERAGE: 2000–2004 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Mean = 1.744 
SD    = 2.082 
n   = 192 
Mean = 2.559 
SD    = 2.410 
n   = 79 
Mean = 2.191 
SD   = 7.495 
n   = 125 
Mean = 0.865 
SD    = 1.155 
n  = 68 
Mean = 0.617 
SD    = 1.016 
n    = 143 
Mean = 1.004 
    SD = 1.156 
n   = 29 
Mean = 0.203 
SD    = 0.357 
n   = 64  129
 
FIGURE 6.3 
DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENDITURE ACROSS LOCAL COUNCILS 
AUSTRALIAN STATES, AVERAGE: 2000–2004 
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SD    = 2.172 
n   = 79 
Mean = 2.039 
SD   = 6.666 
n   = 125 
Mean = 0.899 
SD    = 1.034 
n   = 68 
Mean = 0.637 
SD    = 0.872 
n    = 143 
Mean = 0.259 
SD    = 0.364 
n  = 29 
Mean = 0.259 
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6.2.2  Subnational fiscal inequality by geographical region and governmental hierarchy 
 
Table 6.2 provides a framework for the analysis of fiscal inequality when the sets 
of SNGs are identified by geographically defined region. For this study, each subnational 
region consists of the geographical region defined by state borders and comprises the 
state government and a number of local governments within these borders. Each row of 
the table represents one of the G  regions (geographical states) in the country. Consider 
region  g  as an example. As indicated in column 2, there are  g n  local councils in this 
region plus one state government, so there are  1 g n +  revenue shares,  1, 1 ,..., , .
gg gg n g n rr r +  




g kg k rR
+
= = ∑  as presented in column 3. These total regional 




gg k gg k Rr
== ∈ = = ∑ ∑∑ S  as indicated 
by the last element of column 3. Column 4 of the table presents the number of all SNGs 
in each region,  1,..., , G NN  as well as the total number in the whole economy,  . N  
TABLE 6.2 
THE ANALYTICS OF THE GEOGRAPHIC ALLOCATION OF REVENUE 
Region  Revenue shares  
of subnational region 
g   Individual shares  Total 
Number of subnational regions 
(state and local councils) 
(1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
1 
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To apply the above framework to the Australian case, we have  7, G =  as there are 
six states and one territory that contain local councils (the ACT is excluded as it has no  131
local councils). Each of the seven SNGs contains one state government and a number of 
local councils. Take Western Australia as an example. As there are 143 local councils in 
this state, there are 143 revenue shares  ,1 ,143 ,..., , gg rr  for  , g WA =  while the revenue share 
for the WA state government is  ,144. g r  The total of these 144 shares, 
144
, 1 , g kg k rR
= = ∑  is the 
share of national revenue accounted for by WA. For Australia as a whole, there are 700 
local councils and 7 states, so  707 N = . 
 
In accordance with the analysis in Sections 5.3 and 5.4 of chapter 5, total revenue 
inequality for Australia with  707 N =  and  7 G =  is: 
    
77
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The first component on the right-hand side is the within-state inequality for revenue 




























N = ∑  
Table 6.3 reveals that within-state fiscal inequality accounts for 96.4 per cent and 
96.9 per cent total inequality in terms of revenue and expenditure, respectively. Clearly, 
the within-state fiscal inequality plays a significant role in total inequality of the 
distribution of revenue and expenditure across subnational regions in Australia. This is 
partly because each subnational region includes both state and local governments, and the 
state government is significantly larger than any local government within the same 
region. For example, the total subnational share of Australian revenue collected from 
NSW (i.e.  NSW R ) was 31.7 per cent in 2004, of which 27.1 per cent came from the NSW 
government ( NSW r ) and only 4.6 per cent from the 192 local governments within NSW. 
Another possible reason for the dominance of the within-state component of fiscal 
inequality is the operation of the system of fiscal equalisation in Australia. Fiscal  132
equalisation has a “tendency” to equalise per capita revenue and expenditure among 
states, which causes the between-state inequality to be low, or the within-state inequality 
to be high. 
TABLE 6.3 
FISCAL INEQUALITIES ACROSS SUBNATIONAL REGIONS 
BY GEOGRAPHIC REGION 
AUSTRALIA, 2004 
Inequality measure  Revenue  Expenditure 
Total inequality  1.727 1.763 
 Between-region  inequality    0.063 0.054 
 Within-region  inequality  (WRI)  1.664 1.709 
Inequality within:     
  New South Wales  0.573 0.622 
 Victoria  0.348 0.343 
 Queensland  0.365 0.340 
 South  Australia  0.106 0.123 
 Western  Australia  0.228 0.215 
 Tasmania  0.029 0.034 
 Northern  Territory  0.015 0.032 
WRI as the percentage of total inequality  96.4  96.9 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
Total inequality can also be disaggregated in terms of governmental hierarchy 
with the two sets being considered as: (i) the upper-tier SNGs, the set consisting of the 
seven states and territories; and (ii) the lower-tier SNGs, the 700 local councils. Table 6.4 
presents the results when fiscal inequality is decomposed in this way.  
 
The results show that when local councils and states are completely isolated in 
this way, the fiscal inequality between the set of state governments and the set of local 
governments is much larger than the fiscal inequality within the set of states and within 
the set of local governments. In short, fiscal inequality between sets of the state and local 
governments accounts for 89.9 per cent of revenue inequality and 91.5 per cent of 
expenditure inequality. This result also reflects the ideas discussed in the previous 
paragraph.  133
TABLE 6.4 
FISCAL INEQUALITIES ACROSS LEVELS OF GOVERNMENTS BY 
GOVERNMENTAL HIERARCHY 
AUSTRALIA, 2004 
Inequality measure  Revenue  Expenditure 
Total inequality  1.727 1.763 
 
Between-level of government inequality (BLI) 
(i.e. between state and local governments) 
1.552 1.613 
 
Within-level of government inequality 
(i.e. within state and within local governments) 
0.175 0.150 
Inequality within:     
 State  governments  0.118 0.108 
 Local  governments  0.057 0.042 
BLI as the percentage of total inequality  89.9  91.5 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
FIGURE 6.4 
FISCAL INEQUALITY OF REVENUE BY COMPONENT 
AUSTRALIA, 2004 
Geographic regions  Governmental hierarchy 
   
  
The above results have important implications for the measurement of fiscal 
decentralisation when the indices developed in Chapters 3 and 4 are extended to reflect 
the dispersion of revenue and expenditure among SNGs. First, from the governmental 
hierarchy perspective, most fiscal “dispersion” is due to fiscal difference between state 
and local governments. This is consistent with decentralised fiscal constitutions. This is 
to be expected as state governments are more fiscally important than local governments. 









decentralisation. Second, the fiscal dispersion due to within-state government and within-
local government inequality should have more significant impact on measuring fiscal 
decentralisation. This reflects the view that the nation is considered fiscally decentralised 
if fiscal dispersion of revenue and expenditure is identical for subnational units of the 
same level (i.e. state government versus state government and local government versus 
local government). When this is not the case, the fundamental and enhanced indices may 
need to be revised. This will need to be the subject of future research.  
 
6.3  Denmark and fiscal decentralisation 
 
The analytical framework of SNGs’ fiscal inequality is now applied to Denmark – 
a unitary nation with a high per capita income level. The reasons for Denmark’s 
application in the study are as follows. First, a test of the framework of SNGs’ fiscal 
inequality is conducted for another country with different fiscal arrangements to Australia 
(i.e. federal versus unitary nations). Second, Denmark is the only country for which data 
necessary for every level of government are available. Third, SNGs’ fiscal inequality in 
Australia can be “compared” with another country so that some implications of SNGs’ 
fiscal inequality can be drawn. 
 
There are three “autonomous” political and administrative levels in the current 
structure of the Danish government. First, the national government is a parliamentary 
system of government. Second, the regional level is represented by the counties. Third, 
the local authorities represent the lowest level of government – the local level. Regional 
and local governments play an important role and there is very close cooperation between 
national and subnational governments (Denmark’s Government, 2003). At the regional 
level, Denmark consists of 16 counties, which include Copenhagen (a city) and 
Frederiksberg (a borough) without local governments. It is generally accepted that the 
two regional governments of Copenhagen and Frederiksberg also serve as local 
governments
7. Table 6.5 presents a summary of 14 counties (excluding the city of 
Copenhagen and the borough of Frederiksberg) and 273 local municipalities in Denmark. 
                                                 
7 See Appendix A6.1 for an alternative treatment.  135
TABLE 6.5 
A SUMMARY OF COUNTIES AND MUNICIPALITIES  
DENMARK, 2002 
No. County  Abbreviation  A number of local 
municipalities 
1 Copenhagen  COP  18 
2 Frederiksborg  FRE  19 
3 Roskilde  ROS  11 
4 West  Zealand  WES  23 
5 Storstrøm  STO  24 
6 Bornholm  BOR  5 
7 Funen  FUN  32 
8 South  Jutland  SOU  23 
9 Ribe  RIB  14 
10 Vejle  Amtskommune  VEJ  16 
11 Ringkøbing  RIN  18 
12 Århus  ARH  26 
13 Viborg  VIB  17 
14 North  Jutland  county  NOR  27 
   Total  14  273 
Source: Statistics Denmark (2005). 
 
6.3.1  Distribution of revenue and expenditure across counties 
 
Figure 6.5 reveals the distribution of revenue and expenditure shares of 273 local 
municipalities in 14 counties in Denmark. Consequently, the distribution of revenue 
collection and expenditure across the various municipalities are different. As such, fiscal 
inequality among municipalities is, in terms of revenue and expenditure, expected to be 
significant. Table 6.5 provides the descriptive statistics regarding revenue shares and 
expenditure shares for all 14 counties in Denmark. 
 FIGURE 6.5 
DISTRIBUTION OF LOCAL MUNICIPALITY SHARES  








































































































Mean = 3.66 
SD     = 8.17 
 n   = 273 
Mean = 3.66 
SD = 6.37 
n = 273 
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TABLE 6.6 
LOCAL MUNICIPALITIES, DENMARK 
REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE SHARES, AVERAGE: 1990-2002 
(1,000*Per cent of total)   
Revenue shares  Expenditure shares 
No. Region Number of   
municipalities 
Mean Median Standard
Deviation Min Max Mean Median Standard 
Deviation  Min Max 
1 COP  18  6.7526  6.5001  3.8681  1.5027 15.583  7.6390 8.0376  3.9513  1.8763  14.728 
2 FRE  19  3.9608  3.0043  3.5472  0.9109 15.234  4.0062 3.7275  3.0670  0.9848  14.564 
3 ROS  11  4.2588  1.6566  5.4968  1.1106 18.874  4.2442 2.1691  4.2583  1.3000  13.659 
4 WES  23  2.4998  1.6515  2.3295  0.5768 8.754  2.6694 1.7430  2.0739  0.9387  7.948 
5 STO  24  2.1879  1.1834  2.3871  0.4919 9.762  2.2607 1.4348  2.0774  0.7508  9.834 
6 BOR  5  1.8144  1.3254  1.3290  1.0509 4.177  1.9281 1.5156  1.0311  1.2292  3.739 
7 FUN  32  3.1022  1.1189  8.3822  0.5532 48.138  3.1435 1.2733  7.5450  0.6833  43.487 
8 SOU  23  1.5908  1.1556  1.3757  0.3269 5.132  2.0083 1.6310  1.5282  0.5560  6.159 
9 RIB  14 3.5430  1.3769  7.1086  0.6241 27.915  3.3745 1.7879  5.2296  0.6700  21.147 
10 VEJ  16  4.9382  1.6671  6.6169  0.6583 20.142  4.5859 2.1899  5.0546  0.8864  13.976 
11 RIN  18  3.4026  1.2277  5.5243  0.4508 23.298  3.0514 1.6300  3.4567  0.6482  14.619 
12 ARH  26  6.6623  1.2009  20.2353  0.6666 103.107  5.6366 1.6550  14.7973  0.8513  76.282 
13 VIB  17  2.1162  0.9827  2.3414  0.6410 9.209  2.5667 1.3493  2.2544  1.0697  9.034 
14 NOR  27  3.7911  1.3856  8.9113  0.6666 47.286    3.7737 1.9123  7.1839  0.6021  38.768 
Source: Statistics Denmark. 
 
 
6.3.2  Fiscal inequality: Geographic region versus governmental hierarchy analysis 
 
The same framework for the analysis of SNGs’ fiscal inequality developed in 
Section 6.2.2 for Australia is again used. However, this time  14 G =  (not 16) because the 
city of Copenhagen and the borough of Frederiksberg have been excluded since they 
have no local councils. Each of the 14 regions contains one county government and a 
number of local municipalities. Let’s take the region of Arhus as an example. This region 
consists of the county government of Arhus and 26 local municipalities.  
 
When considered from a regional (i.e. geographically defined) perspective, 
within-region inequality accounts for a substantial level in total fiscal inequality in 
Denmark, 89.6 per cent and 90.8 per cent for revenue shares and expenditure shares, 
respectively. The full geographic region allocations of fiscal inequalities across counties 
in Denmark are presented in Table 6.7 as follows. 
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TABLE 6.7 
FISCAL INEQUALITIES ACROSS SUBNATIONAL REGIONS BY 
GEOGRAPHIC REGIONS, DENMARK, 2002 
Inequality measure  Revenue  Expenditure 
Total inequality  0.3847  0.3274 
  Between-region inequality   0.0398  0.0300 
 Within-region  inequality  (WRI)  0.3449  0.2974 
  Inequality within:    
   Copenhagen  county  0.0222  0.0222 
   Frederiksborg  county  0.0129  0.0139 
   Roskilde  county  0.0096  0.0083 
   West  Zealand  county  0.0195  0.0151 
   Storstrøm  county  0.0161  0.0143 
   Bornholm  county    0.0004  0.0004 
   Funen  county  0.0491  0.0481 
   South  Jutland  county  0.0060  0.0104 
   Ribe  county  0.0160  0.0128 
   Vejle  Amtskommune  county  0.0192  0.0178 
   Ringkøbing  county  0.0087  0.0118 
   Århus  county  0.1110  0.0740 
   Viborg  county  0.0096  0.0101 
   North  Jutland  county  0.0446  0.0382 
WRI as the percentage of total inequality  89.60  90.80 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
Now, as previously discussed, total inequality can be also disaggregated in a 
governmental hierarchy. In this approach, all 14 counties (regional government level) are 
grouped into one set and all 273 local municipalities are grouped into the other set.  
TABLE 6.8 
HIERARCHICAL ALLOCATION OF 
FISCAL INEQUALITIES ACROSS LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT 
DENMARK, 2002 
Inequality measure  Revenue  Expenditure 
Total inequality  0.3847  0.3274 
  Between-level of government inequality (BLI)  0.1108  0.1310 
  Within-level of government inequality  0.2739  0.1964 
   Inequality within:    
    County governments  0.0216  0.0156 
    Municipality governments  0.2523  0.1808 
BLI as the percentage of total inequality  28.8  40.0 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
Table 6.8 presents the results of total fiscal inequality in Denmark when the 
hierarchical approach is used. In contrast with a geographic region analysis, this approach  138
reveals that fiscal inequality of between-level of government inequality no longer plays a 
significant role in total inequality: only 28.8 per cent and 40.0 per cent total fiscal 
inequality for revenue and expenditure shares, respectively. 
 
6.4  Fiscal inequality of Australia and Denmark – a comparison 
 
Sections 6.2 and 6.3 analyse fiscal inequality, in terms of revenue and expenditure 
shares among subnational units, in both countries – Australia and Denmark. In Australia, 
subnational units include 7 state governments and 700 local governments whereas 
subnational units in Denmark consist of 14 counties and 273 local municipalities. Table 
6.9 presents a summary of the results. 
   TABLE 6.9 
FISCAL INEQUALITY IN AUSTRALIA AND DENMARK 
         Australia (2004)    Denmark (2002) 
Inequality measure  Revenue  Expenditure  Revenue  Expenditure 
Total inequality  1.727  1.763  0.3847  0.3274 
1  Geographic regions            
    Between-region inequality ("BRI") 0.063  0.054  0.0398  0.0300 
    Within-region inequality ("WRI") 1.664  1.709  0.3449  0.2974 
  BRI as the percentage of total inequality (%)  3.6  3.1  10.3  9.2 
   WRI as the percentage of total inequality (%) 96.4  96.9    89.7  90.8 
2  Governmental hierarchy           
   Between-level  inequality  ("BLI")  1.552  1.613  0.1108 0.1310 
    Within-level inequality ("WLI")  0.175  0.150  0.2739  0.1964 
  BLI as the percentage of total inequality (%)  89.9  91.5  28.8  40.0 
   WLI as the percentage of total inequality (%) 10.1  8.5    71.2  60.0 
 
In the case of Australia, the within-region inequality accounts for a significant 
degree of fiscal inequality when subnational units (state and local governments) are 
considered on a geographical basis (96.4 per cent for revenue and 96.9 per cent for 
expenditure). However, when sets are defined by state and local governments (i.e. by 
levels of government), the within-level inequality of government is small (10.1 per cent 
for revenue and 8.5 per cent for expenditure). That is, fiscal inequality among state 
governments is relatively modest, and fiscal inequality among local governments is also  139
relatively modest. In this case, fiscal inequality is dominated by the fiscal differences 
between governments of different levels. In short, state government finances are 
relatively large in comparison with all local governments.  
TABLE 6.10 
FISCAL INEQUALITY OF SUBNATIONAL REVENUE 
AUSTRALIA (2004) VERSUS DENMARK (2002) 
Fiscal inequality of subnational revenue 
Country 






















The pattern of fiscal inequality in Denmark is different to that of Australia. In the 
geographic-region analysis, within-region fiscal inequality in Denmark accounts for a 
significant share of fiscal inequality (89.7 per cent for revenue and 90.8 percent for 
expenditure), but not quite as much as in the case of Australia. However, in contrast to 
Australia, within-level fiscal inequality accounts for a significant share of fiscal 
inequality when governmental hierarchy approached is considered (71.2 per cent for 
revenue and 60 per cent for expenditure). These results suggest regional governments in 

















This is in contrast to Australia, where the fiscal size of local governments is much smaller 
than state governments. 
 
TABLE 6.11 
FISCAL INEQUALITY OF SUBNATIONAL EXPENDITURE 
AUSTRALIA (2004) VERSUS DENMARK (2002) 
Fiscal inequality of subnational expenditure 
Country 
















   
 
Tables 6.9, 6.10, and 6.11 reveal the importance of fiscal inequality (or fiscal 
dispersion). In a generally decentralised federal system, the fiscal difference between 
state level and lower-level governments will, typically, be large (i.e. first-tier SNGs will 
be fiscally larger than second-tier SNGs). In entropic terms, this means that fiscal 
inequality in federal systems will be dominated by: (i) “between-level of government” 
inequality, when considered from a governmental hierarchy perspective; and (ii) “within-
region” inequality when considered from the perspective of SNGs, in particular 
geographic regions. This is the case for Australia but is not the case for Denmark. 
 
In a non-federal system, the fiscal differences between county and municipality 

















dispersion in total is relatively modest (see Table 6.9). This is the case for Denmark (total 
revenue inequality of 0.3847) in contrast to the case of Australia (total revenue inequality 
of 1.727). Moreover, no specific “sets” dominate fiscal inequality. From a governmental 
hierarchy perspective, between-level of government inequality and within-level of 
government inequality both contribute to total SNGs’ fiscal inequality.  
 
6.5  Concluding remarks 
 
Australia has three distinct levels of government, namely federal, state and local 
governments. Denmark has only two formal “traditional” tiers
8 as they are in any unitary 
country, namely national and subnational levels. Using the entropic approach, for both 
analyses of geographic regions and governmental hierarchy, the results reveal that 
dispersion of revenue and expenditure shares to each tier of SNGs (state versus local 
levels in Australia; and county versus municipality levels in Denmark) are substantially 
different between Australia and Denmark.  
 
The analysis of fiscal inequality in Australia and Denmark in this chapter reveals 
that fiscal decentralisation is positively correlated with: (i) the extent of fiscal inequality 
in general; (ii) “within-region” fiscal inequality (when subnational governments units are 
grouped by geographic region: the New South Wales region compared to the Western 
Australia region); and (iii) “between-levels of government” fiscal inequality (when 
subnational government units are grouped in accordance with levels of government: state 
versus local). Consequently, without an adjustment for the fiscal decentralisation index, 
there would be a positive bias in the fundamental index (FDI) and the enhanced index 
(eFDI) in favour of unitary forms of government, such as Denmark, and a negative bias 
against discrete multi-tiered federal forms of government, such as Australia. This is even 
evident in the estimates of the fiscal decentralisation index (FDI) developed in Chapter 3 
using the “fiscal autonomy and fiscal importance” approach, which provides a 
fundamental index of fiscal decentralisation for Australia of 0.53, well below the FDI of 
0.62 for unitary Denmark. 
                                                 
8 Local governments vary from large county governments to smaller local authorities.  142
This Australia and Denmark comparison was primarily designed to demonstrate 
and test the variability of the fiscal decentralisation index and the notion of fiscal 
inequality in the entropic approaches as developed and discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. 
However, as this comparison was only done for the two countries for which adequate 
data are available to do so, the findings on the relative efficiency of the two sets of fiscal 
arrangement in Australia and Denmark should be considered provisional in character. 
 
The differences in the level of fiscal inequality among SNGs in Australia and 
Denmark, using both analyses of geographic regions and governmental hierarchy are 
clear. As a result, findings from the framework of subnational fiscal inequality developed 
under the entropic approach will, in future, need to be incorporated into the fundamental 
and enhanced indices to achieve the most accurate measure of the degree of fiscal 
decentralisation that is not biased against multi-tiered federal countries. 
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Appendix A6.1 
FISCAL INEQUALITY WITHOUT AND WITH  
NO-LOCAL-GOVERNMENT REGIONS 
 
The analyses of fiscal inequality in Australia and Denmark, Sections 6.2–6.4, 
have consistently treated regions without local governments which are excluded in the 
analysis of fiscal inequality of the distribution of revenue and expenditure shares across 
subnational units. In particular, Australian Capital Territory (ACT) is excluded from the 
analysis of fiscal inequality for Australia since the ACT has no local governments. Also, 
in the case of Denmark, the cities of Copenhagen and Frederiksberg are excluded since 
these two cities do not have any local governments (or municipalities in the case of 
Denmark). This appendix is devoted to the understanding of fiscal inequality in these two 
countries when their respective no-local-government regions are included in the analysis. 
It means that, ACT is now incorporated into the analysis of fiscal inequality for Australia 
and the same principle is used in Denmark with Copenhagen and Frederiksberg. Table 
A6.1 presents the results of fiscal inequality in Australia and Denmark with these 
changes. 
   
TABLE A6.1 
THE WORLD WITHOUT AND WITH NO-LOCAL-GOVERNMENT REGIONS 
AUSTRALIA VERSUS DENMARK 
AUSTRALIA, 2004    DENMARK, 2002 
Revenue Expenditure Revenue    Expenditure  Fiscal inequality 
Without With  Without With  Without With   Without  With 
Total   1.7273  1.7124 1.7629  1.7447  0.3847  0.4693    0.3274  0.4094
  Between:                
    Geographic  region  0.0636 0.0703 0.0542 0.0647 0.0398 0.1694   0.0300 0.1486
    Governmental  hierarchy  1.5525 1.5081 1.6133 1.5683 0.1109 0.1839   0.1310 0.1986
  Within:               
    Geographic  region  1.6638 1.6421 1.7087 1.6800 0.3449 0.2999   0.2974 0.2608
      Governmental hierarchy  0.1749  0.2043   0.1495  0.1764   0.2739  0.2854    0.1964  0.2108
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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The examinations of fiscal inequality in Australia and Denmark in this Appendix 
reveal many interesting and important results. When no-local-government regions are 
incorporated into the analysis of fiscal inequality, the changes in fiscal inequalities from 
the two countries are not consistent. Total fiscal inequality does not change substantially 
for Australia. However, fiscal inequality in Denmark increases substantially, compared 
with Australia, with this incorporation of these two no-local-government regions. While 
the Australian Capital Territory accounts for only 0.013 per cent and 0.017 per cent of 
total subnational revenue and expenditure, respectively, of all subnational units (states 
and local councils) in Australia, Copenhagen City and Frederiksberg Borough account for 
a very substantial share of revenue and expenditure in Denmark – 0.107 per cent and 
0.104 per cent for Copenhagen City, and 0.029 per cent and 0.030 per cent for 
Frederiksberg. So, while the incorporation of the Australian Capital Territory does not 
change the degree of total fiscal inequality in Australia, this is not the same for Denmark 
when Copenhagen City and Frederiksberg Borough are included. Consequently, results 
require a cautious treatment in the analysis of fiscal inequality from country to country in 
the presence of no-local-government regions but they do not alter the general findings 
outlined in Section 6.4.        
 